Preference restrictions in computational social choice: recent progress by Elkind, E, Lackner, M, Peters, D

Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice by Maurice Salles

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Justified Representation for Perpetual Voting by Laurent Bulteau, Noam Hazon, Rutvik Page, Ariel Rosenfeld, Nimrod Talmon

Subjects: “…Computational social choice…”
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Multi-Winner Election Control via Social Influence: Hardness and Algorithms for Restricted Cases by Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo

Subjects: “…computational social choice…”
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Recommending Links to Control Elections via Social Influence by Federico Corò, Gianlorenzo D’Angelo, Yllka Velaj

Subjects: “…computational social choice…”
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Special Issue on “Algorithm Engineering: Towards Practically Efficient Solutions to Combinatorial Problems” by Mattia D’Emidio, Daniele Frigioni

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Voting application : where we will go for dinner? by Marcellino

“…The design of voting rules has been deeply studied for centuries by great minds in the scientific field called social choice theory. Computational social choice (COMSOC) is a new field that was formed in the early 2000s. …”
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Tournament solutions by Brandt, F, Brill, M, Harrenstein, B

“…This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. …”

Winner determination in huge elections with MapReduce by Csar, T, Lackner, M, Pichler, R, Sallinger, E

“…In computational social choice, we are concerned with the development of methods for joint decision making. …”

It only takes a few: On the Hardness of voting with a constant number of agents by Harrenstein, P, Brandt, F, Kardel, K, Seedig, H

“…Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced by the pairwise majority relation. …”

Protecting elections by recounting ballots by Elkind, E, Gan, J, Obraztsova, S, Rabinovich, Z, Voudouris, A

“…<jats:p>Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. …”

Protecting elections by recounting ballots by Elkind, E, Gan, J, Obraztsova, S, Rabinovich, Z, Voudouris, AA

“…Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. …”

Algorithms for swap and shift bribery in structured elections by Elkind, E, Faliszewski, P, Gupta, S, Roy, S

“…In computational social choice, shift bribery is the procedure of paying voters to shift the briber's preferred candidate forward in their preferences so as to make this candidate an election winner; the more general swap bribery procedure also allows one to pay voters to swap other candidates in their preferences. …”

Restricted preference domains in social choice: two perspectives by Elkind, E

“…Restricted preference domains also play an important role in computational social choice: for instance, there are voting rules that are NP-hard to compute in general, but admit efficient winner determination algorithms when voters’ preferences belong to a restricted domain. …”

k-Majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters by Bachmeier, G, Brandt, F, Geist, C, Harrenstein, P, Kardel, K, Peters, D, Seedig, H

“…Many hardness results in computational social choice use the fact that every digraph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. …”

On recognising nearly single-crossing preferences by Jaeckle, F, Peters, D, Elkind, E

“…If voters' preferences are one-dimensional, many hard problems in computational social choice become tractable. A preference profile can be classified as one-dimensional if it has the single-crossing property, which requires that the voters can be ordered from left to right so that their preferences are consistent with this order. …”

A Voting-Based System for Ethical Decision Making by Noothigattu, Ritesh, Gaikwad, Snehalkumar "Neil" S., Awad, Edmond, Dsouza, Sohan, Rahwan, Iyad, Ravikumar, Pradeep, Procaccia, Ariel D.

“…We present a general approach to automating ethical decisions, drawing on machine learning and computational social choice. In a nutshell, we propose to learn a model of societal preferences, and, when faced with a specific ethical dilemma at runtime, efficiently aggregate those preferences to identify a desirable choice. …”
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Protecting elections by recounting ballots by Elkind, Edith, Gan, Jiarui, Obraztsova, Svetlana, Rabinovich, Zinovi, Voudouris, Alexandros A.

“…Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. …”
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Judgement aggregation in multi-agent argumentation by Awad, Edmond, Booth, Richard, Tohmé, Fernando, Rahwan, Iyad

“…In addition to identifying fundamental barriers to collective argument evaluation, our results contribute to research at the intersection of the argumentation and computational social choice fields.…”
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AND testing and robust judgement aggregation by Filmus, Yuval, Lifshitz, Noam, Minzer, Dor, Mossel, Elchanan

“…Our theorem implies a strong result on judgement aggregation in computational social choice. In the language of social choice, our result shows that if f is ϵ-close to satisfying judgement aggregation, then it is (ϵ)-close to an oligarchy (the name for the AND function in social choice theory). …”
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