Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation by Wenqiang Zhu, Xin Wang, Chaoqian Wang, Longzhao Liu, Hongwei Zheng, Shaoting Tang

“…We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. …”
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Learning to Prevent Grasp Failure with Soft Hands: From Online Prediction to Dual‐Arm Grasp Recovery by Giuseppe Averta, Federica Barontini, Irene Valdambrini, Paolo Cheli, Davide Bacciu, Matteo Bianchi

“…At the same time, their usage poses new challenges, related to the adoption of classical sensing techniques originally developed for rigid end defectors, which provide fundamental information, such as to detect object slippage. …”
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Strong links promote the emergence of cooperative elites by Gallo, Edoardo, Riyanto, Yohanes E., Teh, Tat-How, Roy, Nilanjan

“…A dichotomous society emerges with cooperators prospering in a close-knit, strongly bound elite, and defectors earning low payoffs in a weakly connected periphery. …”
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Emergent multilevel selection in a simple spatial model of the evolution of altruism. by Rutger Hermsen

“…This reveals that individual colonies inevitably succumb to defectors in a within-colony "tragedy of the commons". …”
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I dare you to punish me-vendettas in games of cooperation. by Katrin Fehl, Ralf D Sommerfeld, Dirk Semmann, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck, Manfred Milinski

“…Here, punishment was mainly targeted at defectors in the beginning, but provocations led to mushrooming of counter-punishments. …”
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A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies. by Rolf Kümmerli

“…In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the police institutions common to modern human societies. …”
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Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation by Hisashi Ohtsuki

“…Results for an infinitely large population show that conditional cooperation not only works as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, but sustains a polymorphic attractor with unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators being present. …”
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When and How Does Mutation-Generated Variation Promote the Evolution of Cooperation? by Mathias Spichtig, Martijn Egas

“…Whereas this direct effect suffices to explain earlier findings, we question its generality because mutational variation usually generates the highest direct fitness impact on unconditional defectors (AllD). We identify special conditions (e.g., intermediate mutation rates) for which cooperation can be favored by an indirect effect of mutation, i.e., the fitness impact that individuals experience from interactions with descendants of mutants. …”
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Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas by Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen

“…Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. …”
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The Don Cossacks at the Polish Front in 1919 by Andrey V. Venkov

“…Experience has shown that during the development of red Cossack units Bolsheviks had to rely on a few volunteers and defectors. Forcibly mobilized Cossacks were unreliable and turned to the enemy.…”
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Coevolutionary dynamics of aspiration and strategy in spatial repeated public goods games by Te Wu, Feng Fu, Long Wang

“…Results show threshold phenomenon for harsh collective dilemma: cooperators sticking to high levels of aspiration can prevail over defectors, while cooperators with other levels are invariably wiped out. …”
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When punishment pays. by Gilbert Roberts

“…In repeated games within groups, punishment works by imposing costs on defectors so that it pays them to switch to cooperating. …”
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Analysis of Dollarization Hysteresis among North Korean Consumers by Jooyung Lee

“…This paper quantitatively analyzes the current status of North Korean consumer payment instruments through a questionnaire survey of 292 North Korean defectors. In the 2010s, it was found that the payment experience ratio of domestic currency cash and grain decreased, while the payment experience ratio of foreign currency cash increased. …”

Mobility can promote the evolution of cooperation via emergent self-assortment dynamics. by Jaideep Joshi, Iain D Couzin, Simon A Levin, Vishwesha Guttal

“…We demonstrate that, despite possessing no information about others' traits or payoffs, mobility (via self-propulsion or environmental forcing) facilitates assortment of cooperators via a dynamically evolving difference in the cohesive tendencies of cooperators and defectors. We show analytically that this assortment can also be viewed in a multilevel selection framework, where selection for cooperation among emergent groups can overcome selection against cooperators within the groups. …”
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Application of facial-submental artery island flap in reconstruction of oral and maxillofacial defects by CHEN Weiliang

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Opposition strategy-formation in autocracies: a theory of coordination with evidence from Latin America by Jimenez Morales, M

“…</p> <p>Based on 239 semi-structured interviews with opposition elites, academics, journalists, regime defectors, civil society members, amongst others, collected during iterative field research trips between 2014 and 2019 to the US, Mexico and Venezuela, this study hones in on repression as an explanatory variable for opposition strategic choices in autocracies. …”

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions by Miguel edos Santos, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Victoria A. Braithwaite, Claus eWedekind, Claus eWedekind

“…In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. …”
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Evolution of cooperation with individual diversity on interdependent weighted networks by Sicheng Liu, Lin Zhang, Baokui Wang

“…Remarkably, the numerical analysis shows that, as the network interdependence considering individual diversity increases, cooperation thrives on one network joining in PD, the other engaging in SG may be plagued by defectors. Meanwhile, there exists an optimal region of mixed-coupling between networks to persist in cooperation of one network. …”
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Data on how abundance of resource inflows and punishment types affect resource extraction behavior by Anna Lou Abatayo, John Lynham

“…A session is randomly assigned (1) to vary whether the inflow of resources at the beginning of each round is high or low, and (2) to allow participants to either financially punish or socially punish defectors. A financial punishment resulted to a loss in profit for the punished while a social punishment displayed the words “You have extracted too much! …”
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Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Cooperation-Defection Dominance Strategies on Correlational Multilayer Networks by Qin Li, Guopeng Zhao, Minyu Feng

“…Under the defection dominance strategy, the WS layer appears different from the first two strategies, and we conclude through simulation that when the payoff parameter is at the middle level, its cooperator proportion will be suppressed, and we deduce that the proportion of cooperators and defectors, as well as the payoff, play an important role.…”
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