Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients choose wh...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Priyodorshi Banerjee, Sujoy Chakravarty, Sanmitra Ghosh
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2016-01-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
dictator and ultimatum games
non-binding communication with intent
partner selection
competing promises
credibility and credulity
C78
C91
D03
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/1/3

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/1/3

Similar Items