Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?

Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?

The central purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive contract as an equilibrium phenomenon. We analyse a model of vertical differentiation in which we deal with the strategic role of the competitor’s decisions in a successive duopoly. Is it better for a processor to offer an incentive contr...

Szczegółowa specyfikacja

Opis bibliograficzny
Główni autorzy: Marta Fernández-Olmos, Jorge Rosell Martínez, Manuel Antonio Espitia Escuer, Luz María Marín Vinuesa
Format: Artykuł
Język:English
Wydane: OmniaScience 2009-07-01
Seria:Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
Hasła przedmiotowe:
incentive contract
moral hazard
successive duopoly
equilibrium
Dostęp online:http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/43

Internet

http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/43

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