Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Wage-Rise Contracts as Strategic Device

This paper considers a mixed duopoly market in which a private firm competes against a public firm. Each firm first has to choose the timing for offering a wage-rise contract as a strategic device. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm chooses either stage two or stage three...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Mashhad: Behzad Hassannezhad Kashani 2020-07-01
Series:International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.ijmae.com/article_114333_c2a9e8917150a51dd7b275029dc8263c.pdf