Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions

Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should ov...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yoshikazu Ikeda, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Naoko Nishimura, Timothy N. Cason
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2011-09-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
ascending-bid auction
second price auction
experiment
dominant strategy
social preferences
spite
reciprocity
English auction
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/3/365/

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/3/365/

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