Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions
The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should ov...
Main Authors: | Yoshikazu Ikeda, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Naoko Nishimura, Timothy N. Cason |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2011-09-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/3/365/ |
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