An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining
Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the d...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2013-08-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/375 |
| _version_ | 1818379813732220928 |
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| author | William Reed Timothy Nordstrom Charles A. Holt David Clark Katri Sieberg |
| author_facet | William Reed Timothy Nordstrom Charles A. Holt David Clark Katri Sieberg |
| author_sort | William Reed |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by conflict with a random outcome. Observed demands at each stage are significantly correlated with power, as measured by the probability of winning in the event of disagreement. Demand patterns, however, are flatter than theoretical predictions, and conflict occurs in a significant proportion of the interactions, regardless of the degree of the power asymmetry. To address these deviations from the standard game-theoretic predictions, we also estimated a logit quantal response model, which generated the qualitative patterns that are observed in the data. This one-parameter generalization of the Nash equilibrium permits a deconstruction of the strategic incentives that cause demands to be less responsive to power asymmetries than Nash predictions. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-14T02:08:45Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-1302870f16b04fff8a32d6d1f34d9369 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-14T02:08:45Z |
| publishDate | 2013-08-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-1302870f16b04fff8a32d6d1f34d93692022-12-21T23:20:48ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362013-08-014337539710.3390/g4030375An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict BargainingWilliam ReedTimothy NordstromCharles A. HoltDavid ClarkKatri SiebergDemands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by conflict with a random outcome. Observed demands at each stage are significantly correlated with power, as measured by the probability of winning in the event of disagreement. Demand patterns, however, are flatter than theoretical predictions, and conflict occurs in a significant proportion of the interactions, regardless of the degree of the power asymmetry. To address these deviations from the standard game-theoretic predictions, we also estimated a logit quantal response model, which generated the qualitative patterns that are observed in the data. This one-parameter generalization of the Nash equilibrium permits a deconstruction of the strategic incentives that cause demands to be less responsive to power asymmetries than Nash predictions.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/375bargainingconflictquantal response equilibriumlaboratory experiments |
| spellingShingle | William Reed Timothy Nordstrom Charles A. Holt David Clark Katri Sieberg An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining Games bargaining conflict quantal response equilibrium laboratory experiments |
| title | An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining |
| title_full | An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining |
| title_fullStr | An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining |
| title_short | An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining |
| title_sort | experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining |
| topic | bargaining conflict quantal response equilibrium laboratory experiments |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/375 |
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