Optimal Decision Rules in Repeated Games Where Players Infer an Opponent’s Mind via Simplified Belief Calculation

Optimal Decision Rules in Repeated Games Where Players Infer an Opponent’s Mind via Simplified Belief Calculation

In strategic situations, humans infer the state of mind of others, e.g., emotions or intentions, adapting their behavior appropriately. Nonetheless, evolutionary studies of cooperation typically focus only on reaction norms, e.g., tit for tat, whereby individuals make their next decisions by only co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Mitsuhiro Nakamura, Hisashi Ohtsuki
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2016-07-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
cooperation
direct reciprocity
repeated game
Markov decision process
heuristics
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/3/19

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/3/19

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