Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups

Incentives shape how much people contribute to the welfare of a group. These incentives do not restrict the opportunities but they change the costs of contributions. This paper studies how the random assignment of such incentives affects perceived distributive justice among group members. Do people...

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Main Author: Gerald Eisenkopf
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2018-09-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/71
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author Gerald Eisenkopf
author_facet Gerald Eisenkopf
author_sort Gerald Eisenkopf
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description Incentives shape how much people contribute to the welfare of a group. These incentives do not restrict the opportunities but they change the costs of contributions. This paper studies how the random assignment of such incentives affects perceived distributive justice among group members. Do people consider differences in incentives similar to unequal opportunities, that is, situations in which some people have a lower chance to make a high contribution? The results from a real effort experiment show that the economic framing of incentives matters in this context. If some people do not work for the common good because of rather large private costs, they appreciate these ‘negative incentives’ similarly to unequal opportunities. They do not do so, and become less egalitarian, if lower effort for the group increases the chance for private gains (‘positive incentives’). Interestingly, participants reward group members who do not limit their expected contributions to the group despite adverse incentives.
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spelling doaj.art-2bdb9e3cec564e9591c35eb2628e1d052022-12-22T01:05:50ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362018-09-01937110.3390/g9030071g9030071Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in GroupsGerald Eisenkopf0Faculty I, University of Vechta, 49377 Vechta, GermanyIncentives shape how much people contribute to the welfare of a group. These incentives do not restrict the opportunities but they change the costs of contributions. This paper studies how the random assignment of such incentives affects perceived distributive justice among group members. Do people consider differences in incentives similar to unequal opportunities, that is, situations in which some people have a lower chance to make a high contribution? The results from a real effort experiment show that the economic framing of incentives matters in this context. If some people do not work for the common good because of rather large private costs, they appreciate these ‘negative incentives’ similarly to unequal opportunities. They do not do so, and become less egalitarian, if lower effort for the group increases the chance for private gains (‘positive incentives’). Interestingly, participants reward group members who do not limit their expected contributions to the group despite adverse incentives.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/71distributive justiceunequal incentivesexperimententitlements
spellingShingle Gerald Eisenkopf
Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups
Games
distributive justice
unequal incentives
experiment
entitlements
title Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups
title_full Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups
title_fullStr Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups
title_full_unstemmed Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups
title_short Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups
title_sort unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
topic distributive justice
unequal incentives
experiment
entitlements
url http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/71
work_keys_str_mv AT geraldeisenkopf unequalincentivesandperceivedfairnessingroups