Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer

Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer

We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller’s preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in the choice(s) of the buyer regardless of the state of th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jeahan Jung, Jeong Yoo Kim
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2024-05-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
cheap talk
crosschecking strategy
fully revealing equilibrium
informed receiver
monotone motive
tolerance in deviation
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/3/20

Internet

https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/3/20

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