Incentive Compatible and Globally Efficient Position Based Routing for Selfish Reverse Multicast in Wireless Sensor Networks

Incentive Compatible and Globally Efficient Position Based Routing for Selfish Reverse Multicast in Wireless Sensor Networks

We consider the problem of all-to-one selfish routing in the absence of a payment scheme in wireless sensor networks, where a natural model for cost is the power required to forward, referring to the resulting game as a Locally Minimum Cost Forwarding (LMCF). Our objective is to characterize equilib...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Sarvesh Varatharajan, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Allon Percus, Adam Meyerson, Stephan Eidenbenz
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2009-10-01
Series:Algorithms
Subjects:
sensor networks
incentive compatible topology control
game theory
price of stability
price of anarchy
heuristics for NP-hard problems
location based routing
local algorithms
random Euclidean power graphs
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/2/4/1303/

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/2/4/1303/

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