Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

Budish (2011) proposes a new mechanism for the problem of combinatorial assignment -- e.g., assigning students to schedules of courses -- called approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). While the CEEI mechanism satisfies attractive properties of efficiency, fairness, and incent...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Eric Budish
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: European Alliance for Innovation (EAI) 2016-12-01
Series:EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games
Subjects:
market design
matching
combinatorial allocation
course allocation
scheduling
tabu search
competitive equilibrium
experiments
preference elicitation
user interface design
Online Access:http://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2261075

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http://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2261075

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