Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets

Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets

We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Geir B. Asheim, Mark Voorneveld, Jörgen W. Weibull
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2016-11-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
epistemic game theory
epistemic robustness
rationalizability
closedness under rational behavior
mutual p-belief
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/37

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/37

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