Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets
We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2016-11-01
|
| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/37 |
| _version_ | 1819089675160125440 |
|---|---|
| author | Geir B. Asheim Mark Voorneveld Jörgen W. Weibull |
| author_facet | Geir B. Asheim Mark Voorneveld Jörgen W. Weibull |
| author_sort | Geir B. Asheim |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Y i contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y − i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T22:11:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-4c12ee28e3644bb68fb2c69fe5edcc9f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T22:11:42Z |
| publishDate | 2016-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-4c12ee28e3644bb68fb2c69fe5edcc9f2022-12-21T18:48:34ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362016-11-01743710.3390/g7040037g7040037Epistemically Robust Strategy SubsetsGeir B. Asheim0Mark Voorneveld1Jörgen W. Weibull2Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, NorwayDepartment of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, SwedenDepartment of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, SwedenWe define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Y i contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y − i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/37epistemic game theoryepistemic robustnessrationalizabilityclosedness under rational behaviormutual p-belief |
| spellingShingle | Geir B. Asheim Mark Voorneveld Jörgen W. Weibull Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets Games epistemic game theory epistemic robustness rationalizability closedness under rational behavior mutual p-belief |
| title | Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets |
| title_full | Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets |
| title_fullStr | Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets |
| title_short | Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets |
| title_sort | epistemically robust strategy subsets |
| topic | epistemic game theory epistemic robustness rationalizability closedness under rational behavior mutual p-belief |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/4/37 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT geirbasheim epistemicallyrobuststrategysubsets AT markvoorneveld epistemicallyrobuststrategysubsets AT jorgenwweibull epistemicallyrobuststrategysubsets |