Response to Frierson’s “Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique and Phenomenology”

In this paper, I reject Frierson’s interpretation of Kantian reductionist phenomenology. I diagnose his failure to articulate a more robust notion of phenomenology in Kant as traceable to a misguided effort to protect pure reason from the undue influence of sensibility. But in fact Kant himself reli...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jeanine Grenberg
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Ediciones Complutense (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) 2016-06-01
Series:Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/147