Response to Frierson’s “Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique and Phenomenology”
In this paper, I reject Frierson’s interpretation of Kantian reductionist phenomenology. I diagnose his failure to articulate a more robust notion of phenomenology in Kant as traceable to a misguided effort to protect pure reason from the undue influence of sensibility. But in fact Kant himself reli...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
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Ediciones Complutense (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)
2016-06-01
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Series: | Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/147 |