Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the...

Disgrifiad llawn

Manylion Llyfryddiaeth
Prif Awdur:	Bruno Forti
Fformat:	Erthygl
Iaith:	English
Cyhoeddwyd:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2024-03-01
Cyfres:	Frontiers in Psychology
Pynciau:	explanatory gap conscious structure phenomenal analysis explanandum qualia early vision
Mynediad Ar-lein:	https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1329259/full

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