An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders

Several heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potentially budget- constrained bidders. Every bidder has private knowledge of his own valuation of the items and his own budget. Due to budget constraints, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values and typically no Walrasian eq...

Deskribapen osoa

Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile Nagusiak: Gerard van der Laan, Zaifu Yang
Formatua: Artikulua
Hizkuntza:English
Argitaratua: Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design 2016-12-01
Saila:Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Gaiak:
Sarrera elektronikoa: http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v001-1/p_04.pdf