The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms
This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager. In the second stage, the firms that hired managers select incentive parameters for...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Mashhad: Behzad Hassannezhad Kashani
2020-03-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics |
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| Online Access: | https://www.ijmae.com/article_115007_db253affc8fac586efa3b38212cefb41.pdf |