Marine tourism omnichannel coordination
Purpose – With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel. Design/...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Emerald Publishing
2022-11-01
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| Series: | Marine Economics and Management |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MAEM-01-2022-0003/full/pdf |
| _version_ | 1797788049047814144 |
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| author | Chaonan Tang Zhisong Chen Jianhui Peng |
| author_facet | Chaonan Tang Zhisong Chen Jianhui Peng |
| author_sort | Chaonan Tang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Purpose – With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel. Design/methodology/approach – This paper studies the optimal practice of bundling pricing and service effort strategies between two tourism suppliers (TSs) and a travel agent (TA) who distributes complementary products in marine tourism omnichannel considering joint efforts of both sides. This study develops five models by Stackelberg and Nash game and introduces the revenue-sharing contract. All outcomes/results are analyzed and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted to derive more managerial implications and business insights. Findings – The main findings show that bundling price is directly proportional to inter-channel integration coefficient and service effort level coefficient, and inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient. TA tends to provide a higher level of service effort than TSs when TA plays a dominant role. Improving the service effort level unduly leads to a decline in profits. Moreover, TSs and TA can reach a win-win situation under the coordination mechanism and the marine tourism omnichannel can achieve the best performance. Originality/value – A novel and useful approach towards joint equilibrium decisions of bundle pricing and service efforts in marine tourism omnichannel with complementary tourism products under different operational strategies is proposed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-13T01:30:04Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6bed46a5bde94ed6bacce2e525cb288a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2516-158X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-13T01:30:04Z |
| publishDate | 2022-11-01 |
| publisher | Emerald Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Marine Economics and Management |
| spelling | doaj.art-6bed46a5bde94ed6bacce2e525cb288a2023-07-04T08:44:09ZengEmerald PublishingMarine Economics and Management2516-158X2022-11-015214717210.1108/MAEM-01-2022-0003Marine tourism omnichannel coordinationChaonan Tang0Zhisong Chen1Jianhui Peng2Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, ChinaBusiness School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, ChinaSchool of Finance and Business, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai, ChinaPurpose – With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel. Design/methodology/approach – This paper studies the optimal practice of bundling pricing and service effort strategies between two tourism suppliers (TSs) and a travel agent (TA) who distributes complementary products in marine tourism omnichannel considering joint efforts of both sides. This study develops five models by Stackelberg and Nash game and introduces the revenue-sharing contract. All outcomes/results are analyzed and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted to derive more managerial implications and business insights. Findings – The main findings show that bundling price is directly proportional to inter-channel integration coefficient and service effort level coefficient, and inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient. TA tends to provide a higher level of service effort than TSs when TA plays a dominant role. Improving the service effort level unduly leads to a decline in profits. Moreover, TSs and TA can reach a win-win situation under the coordination mechanism and the marine tourism omnichannel can achieve the best performance. Originality/value – A novel and useful approach towards joint equilibrium decisions of bundle pricing and service efforts in marine tourism omnichannel with complementary tourism products under different operational strategies is proposed.https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MAEM-01-2022-0003/full/pdfMarine tourism omnichannelBundling pricingComplementary productsService effort level |
| spellingShingle | Chaonan Tang Zhisong Chen Jianhui Peng Marine tourism omnichannel coordination Marine Economics and Management Marine tourism omnichannel Bundling pricing Complementary products Service effort level |
| title | Marine tourism omnichannel coordination |
| title_full | Marine tourism omnichannel coordination |
| title_fullStr | Marine tourism omnichannel coordination |
| title_full_unstemmed | Marine tourism omnichannel coordination |
| title_short | Marine tourism omnichannel coordination |
| title_sort | marine tourism omnichannel coordination |
| topic | Marine tourism omnichannel Bundling pricing Complementary products Service effort level |
| url | https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MAEM-01-2022-0003/full/pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chaonantang marinetourismomnichannelcoordination AT zhisongchen marinetourismomnichannelcoordination AT jianhuipeng marinetourismomnichannelcoordination |