Venture Capital Contracting with Ambiguity Sharing and Effort Complementarity Effect

Venture Capital Contracting with Ambiguity Sharing and Effort Complementarity Effect

In this paper, we established a continuous-time agency model in which an ambiguity-averse venture capitalist (VC) employs an ambiguity-neutral entrepreneur (EN) to manage an innovative project. We analyzed the connection between ambiguity sharing and incentives under double moral hazard. Applying a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jiajia Chang, Zhijun Hu, Hui Yang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-01-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
venture capitalist
ambiguity sharing
effort complementarity
pay-performance sensitivity
relative performance evaluation
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/1/140

Internet

https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/1/140

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