Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
2011-05-01
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| Series: | Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento |
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| Online Access: | http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234/5399 |