CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context

The topic of executive pay-performance sensitivity has resulted in mixed research findings. Literature related to executive remuneration constructs, company performance measures and the underlying theories is critically reviewed in this article. The literature is compared to research findings within...

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Main Author: Mark Bussin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: AOSIS 2015-05-01
Series:South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences
Online Access:https://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/view/838
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author Mark Bussin
author_facet Mark Bussin
author_sort Mark Bussin
collection DOAJ
description The topic of executive pay-performance sensitivity has resulted in mixed research findings. Literature related to executive remuneration constructs, company performance measures and the underlying theories is critically reviewed in this article. The literature is compared to research findings within the South African context pre, during and post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The researcher found similar results in the South African context compared to research in other countries and industries. The research challenges the notion that there is one dominant theory driving CEO compensation. The principal-agent theory, supported by the optimal contract theory, are foremost during periods of strong economic performance, while the influence of managerial power and other behavioural theories appear to prevail during periods of weak economic performance. This article proposes some critical considerations in order to manage this tension.
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spelling doaj.art-8334a9cd4b7d403caa265c64e69551382022-12-22T03:34:04ZengAOSISSouth African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences1015-88122222-34362015-05-0118223224410.4102/sajems.v18i2.838443CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African contextMark Bussin0University of JohannesburgThe topic of executive pay-performance sensitivity has resulted in mixed research findings. Literature related to executive remuneration constructs, company performance measures and the underlying theories is critically reviewed in this article. The literature is compared to research findings within the South African context pre, during and post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The researcher found similar results in the South African context compared to research in other countries and industries. The research challenges the notion that there is one dominant theory driving CEO compensation. The principal-agent theory, supported by the optimal contract theory, are foremost during periods of strong economic performance, while the influence of managerial power and other behavioural theories appear to prevail during periods of weak economic performance. This article proposes some critical considerations in order to manage this tension.https://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/view/838
spellingShingle Mark Bussin
CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences
title CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
title_full CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
title_fullStr CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
title_full_unstemmed CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
title_short CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
title_sort ceo pay performance sensitivity in the south african context
url https://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/view/838
work_keys_str_mv AT markbussin ceopayperformancesensitivityinthesouthafricancontext