Sampling Individually Fundamental Simplexes as Sets of Players’ Mixed Strategies in Finite Noncooperative Game for Applicable Approximate Nash Equilibrium Situations with Possible Concessions
In finite noncooperative game, a method for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations is developed. The method is prior-based on sampling fundamental simplexes being the sets of players’ mixed strategies. Whereas the sampling is exercised, the sets of players’ mixed strategies are mapped into...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Zagreb, Faculty of organization and informatics
2016-06-01
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| Series: | Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences |
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| Online Access: | http://jios.foi.hr/index.php/jios/article/view/988 |