Incentive Mechanism Design for Mitigating Frontrunning and Transaction Reordering in Decentralized Exchanges

Incentive Mechanism Design for Mitigating Frontrunning and Transaction Reordering in Decentralized Exchanges

Decentralized exchanges (DEXes) provide effective price discovery and fair trading while dealing with the drawbacks of centralized exchanges, e.g., lack of transaction transparency and exclusive control of user assets and transaction fees. However, many DEXes suffer from frontrunning and transaction...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Daniel Mawunyo Doe, Jing Li, Niyato Dusit, Li Wang, Zhu Han
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2023-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Blockchain
decentralized exchanges
incentive mechanism
multi-dimensional contract
transaction ordering
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10016729/

Internet

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10016729/

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