Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities

Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities

We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear preferen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2014-04-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
budget constraints
Pareto efficiency
incentive compatibility
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/2/97

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/2/97

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