Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions

Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jochen Staudacher, Felix Wagner, Jan Filipp
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2021-12-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
cooperative game theory
power indices
weighted voting games
dynamic programming
precoalitions
Shapley value
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/1/6

Internet

https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/1/6

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