A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks
Abstract Owing to their flexibility and rapid response, grid-connected distributed energy resources (DERs) are wielding growing influence in frequency regulation markets (FRMs). Nevertheless, compared with conventional large-scale generators, small-scale DERs are usually weakly shielded by cyber sec...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
SpringerOpen
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s41601-023-00332-8 |
| _version_ | 1797630183235125248 |
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| author | Ying Wang Chunyu Chen Sen Zhang Yilong Liu Chongxin Huang Yuxin Du |
| author_facet | Ying Wang Chunyu Chen Sen Zhang Yilong Liu Chongxin Huang Yuxin Du |
| author_sort | Ying Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Owing to their flexibility and rapid response, grid-connected distributed energy resources (DERs) are wielding growing influence in frequency regulation markets (FRMs). Nevertheless, compared with conventional large-scale generators, small-scale DERs are usually weakly shielded by cyber security measures. This offers attackers the opportunity of disrupting the clearing and settlement of FRMs by manipulating the bid information of DERs. In this paper, the frequency regulation market equilibrium is studied considering the dynamic gaming between attackers and defenders, both of which need the knowledge of FRMs for their interventions. Specifically, a tri-level programming model characterizing the attacker–defender–operator (ADO) interdiction problem in FRMs is developed and then analyzed using a column and constraint generation algorithm, thereby achieving market equilibrium representing the defender's best response to the attacker. The defense strategy in the market equilibrium can attenuate the negative influence of cyber attacks upon the FRMs to the maximum extent. Finally, based on the operating rules of the California Independent System Operator, the FRM process considering the ADO interdiction is simulated and the numerical equilibrium results are presented. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T11:03:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a69c92f13c714967bcb422d0d7e80f81 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2367-2617 2367-0983 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T11:03:27Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | SpringerOpen |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-a69c92f13c714967bcb422d0d7e80f812023-11-12T12:20:57ZengSpringerOpenProtection and Control of Modern Power Systems2367-26172367-09832023-11-018111110.1186/s41601-023-00332-8A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacksYing Wang0Chunyu Chen1Sen Zhang2Yilong Liu3Chongxin Huang4Yuxin Du5Southeast UniversityChina University of Mining and TechnologyState Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company Ltd. Research InstituteKTH Royal Institute of TechnologyNanjing University of Posts and TelecommunicationsXuzhou University of TechnologyAbstract Owing to their flexibility and rapid response, grid-connected distributed energy resources (DERs) are wielding growing influence in frequency regulation markets (FRMs). Nevertheless, compared with conventional large-scale generators, small-scale DERs are usually weakly shielded by cyber security measures. This offers attackers the opportunity of disrupting the clearing and settlement of FRMs by manipulating the bid information of DERs. In this paper, the frequency regulation market equilibrium is studied considering the dynamic gaming between attackers and defenders, both of which need the knowledge of FRMs for their interventions. Specifically, a tri-level programming model characterizing the attacker–defender–operator (ADO) interdiction problem in FRMs is developed and then analyzed using a column and constraint generation algorithm, thereby achieving market equilibrium representing the defender's best response to the attacker. The defense strategy in the market equilibrium can attenuate the negative influence of cyber attacks upon the FRMs to the maximum extent. Finally, based on the operating rules of the California Independent System Operator, the FRM process considering the ADO interdiction is simulated and the numerical equilibrium results are presented.https://doi.org/10.1186/s41601-023-00332-8Cyber attackFrequency regulation marketDefender–attacker–operator interdictionTri-level programming |
| spellingShingle | Ying Wang Chunyu Chen Sen Zhang Yilong Liu Chongxin Huang Yuxin Du A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems Cyber attack Frequency regulation market Defender–attacker–operator interdiction Tri-level programming |
| title | A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks |
| title_full | A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks |
| title_fullStr | A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks |
| title_short | A tri-level programming-based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks |
| title_sort | tri level programming based frequency regulation market equilibrium under cyber attacks |
| topic | Cyber attack Frequency regulation market Defender–attacker–operator interdiction Tri-level programming |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1186/s41601-023-00332-8 |
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