Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
Decision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has generally been studied in the domain of risky choice, and many theories of ambi...
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | , |
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| Μορφή: | Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Cambridge University Press
2012-07-01
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| Σειρά: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500002734/type/journal_article |