Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV

Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV

We make a number of remarks about the AES-GCM-SIV nonce-misuse resistant authenticated encryption scheme currently considered for standardization by the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). First, we point out that the security analysis proposed in the ePrint report 2017/168 is incorrect, leading to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Tetsu Iwata, Yannick Seurin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2017-12-01
Series:IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Subjects:
authenticated encryption
AEAD
GCM-SIV
AES-GCM-SIV
CAESAR competition
Online Access:https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/810

Internet

https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/810

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