Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV
We make a number of remarks about the AES-GCM-SIV nonce-misuse resistant authenticated encryption scheme currently considered for standardization by the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). First, we point out that the security analysis proposed in the ePrint report 2017/168 is incorrect, leading to...
Main Authors: | Tetsu Iwata, Yannick Seurin |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2017-12-01
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Series: | IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/810 |
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