Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System

Since moral hazard in behaviors of banking system may jeopardize efficiency of debt mechanisms to fund rising, it is important to examine the empirical and theoretical evidences of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. Risky behavior of banking system is caused by the asymmetric information pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mahshid Shahchera
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 2021-06-01
Series:فصلنامه پژوهش‌های اقتصادی ایران
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ijer.atu.ac.ir/article_12006_07f936f5ba13113e26992e8af808b839.pdf