Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System
Since moral hazard in behaviors of banking system may jeopardize efficiency of debt mechanisms to fund rising, it is important to examine the empirical and theoretical evidences of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. Risky behavior of banking system is caused by the asymmetric information pr...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2021-06-01
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| Series: | فصلنامه پژوهشهای اقتصادی ایران |
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| Online Access: | https://ijer.atu.ac.ir/article_12006_07f936f5ba13113e26992e8af808b839.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797369336510283776 |
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| author | Mahshid Shahchera |
| author_facet | Mahshid Shahchera |
| author_sort | Mahshid Shahchera |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Since moral hazard in behaviors of banking system may jeopardize efficiency of debt mechanisms to fund rising, it is important to examine the empirical and theoretical evidences of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. Risky behavior of banking system is caused by the asymmetric information problems between creditors and central bank. This paper considers the simultaneous effects between changing risk and leverage that justifies existence of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. To do so, we use dynamic panel data model for the period 2006-2019 in Iranian banking system. According to the obtained results, there is a significant positive relationship between the level of risk and leverage. This relationship implies the existence of moral hazard that can be caused unsuccessfully performance of central bank in supervision and supporting in the banking system. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T17:45:17Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-c1ff21b5290d490f98f1e359767e0ccd |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1726-0728 2476-6445 |
| language | fas |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T17:45:17Z |
| publishDate | 2021-06-01 |
| publisher | Allameh Tabataba'i University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | فصلنامه پژوهشهای اقتصادی ایران |
| spelling | doaj.art-c1ff21b5290d490f98f1e359767e0ccd2024-01-02T10:30:04ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University Pressفصلنامه پژوهشهای اقتصادی ایران1726-07282476-64452021-06-01268711113310.22054/ijer.2020.53953.89112006Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking SystemMahshid Shahchera0Assistant Professor, Monetary and Banking Research Institute (Central Bank),Tehran, IranSince moral hazard in behaviors of banking system may jeopardize efficiency of debt mechanisms to fund rising, it is important to examine the empirical and theoretical evidences of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. Risky behavior of banking system is caused by the asymmetric information problems between creditors and central bank. This paper considers the simultaneous effects between changing risk and leverage that justifies existence of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. To do so, we use dynamic panel data model for the period 2006-2019 in Iranian banking system. According to the obtained results, there is a significant positive relationship between the level of risk and leverage. This relationship implies the existence of moral hazard that can be caused unsuccessfully performance of central bank in supervision and supporting in the banking system.https://ijer.atu.ac.ir/article_12006_07f936f5ba13113e26992e8af808b839.pdfbankingmoral hazardbanking riskleveragesimultaneous equations |
| spellingShingle | Mahshid Shahchera Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System فصلنامه پژوهشهای اقتصادی ایران banking moral hazard banking risk leverage simultaneous equations |
| title | Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System |
| title_full | Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System |
| title_fullStr | Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System |
| title_full_unstemmed | Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System |
| title_short | Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System |
| title_sort | empirical and theoretical evidence of moral hazard in the iranian banking system |
| topic | banking moral hazard banking risk leverage simultaneous equations |
| url | https://ijer.atu.ac.ir/article_12006_07f936f5ba13113e26992e8af808b839.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mahshidshahchera empiricalandtheoreticalevidenceofmoralhazardintheiranianbankingsystem |