Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Moral Hazard in the Iranian Banking System
Since moral hazard in behaviors of banking system may jeopardize efficiency of debt mechanisms to fund rising, it is important to examine the empirical and theoretical evidences of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. Risky behavior of banking system is caused by the asymmetric information pr...
Main Author: | Mahshid Shahchera |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | fas |
Published: |
Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2021-06-01
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Series: | فصلنامه پژوهشهای اقتصادی ایران |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ijer.atu.ac.ir/article_12006_07f936f5ba13113e26992e8af808b839.pdf |
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