Institutional Shareholders' Monitoring Intensity and Executive Remuneration in South Africa

Institutional Shareholders' Monitoring Intensity and Executive Remuneration in South Africa

This study investigates the effect of distraction measures as a proxy for the intensity of institutional shareholders' monitoring responsibility regarding corporate executive remuneration in the South African context. We employ the more robust Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation appr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Oloyede OBAGBUWA, Farai KWENDA, Rajendra RAJARAM
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Tripal Publishing House 2023-04-01
Series:Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis
Subjects:
institutional shareholder
agency theory
executive remuneration
institutional shareholder monitoring intensity
gmm
corporate managers.
Online Access:https://ojs.tripaledu.com/jefa/article/view/76

Internet

https://ojs.tripaledu.com/jefa/article/view/76

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