Base rate neglect and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full distributions
Bayesian statistics offers a normative description for how a person should combine their original beliefs (i.e., their priors) in light of new evidence (i.e., the likelihood). Previous research suggests that people tend to under-weight both their prior (base rate neglect) and the likelihood (conserv...
Main Authors: | , , , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2022-09-01
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Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/21/210928/jdm210928.pdf |
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author | Piers Douglas Lionel Howe Andrew Perfors Bradley Walker Yoshihisa Kashima Nicolas Fay |
author_facet | Piers Douglas Lionel Howe Andrew Perfors Bradley Walker Yoshihisa Kashima Nicolas Fay |
author_sort | Piers Douglas Lionel Howe |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Bayesian statistics
offers a normative description for how a person should combine their original
beliefs (i.e., their priors) in light of new evidence (i.e., the likelihood).
Previous research suggests that people tend to under-weight both their prior
(base rate neglect) and the likelihood (conservatism), although this varies by
individual and situation. Yet this work generally elicits people's knowledge as
single point estimates (e.g., x has a 5% probability of occurring) rather than
as a full distribution. Here we demonstrate the utility of eliciting and
fitting full distributions when studying these questions. Across three
experiments, we found substantial variation in the extent to which people
showed base rate neglect and conservatism, which our method allowed us to
measure for the first time simultaneously at the level of the individual. While
most people tended to disregard the base rate, they did so less when the prior
was made explicit. Although many individuals were conservative, there was no
apparent systematic relationship between base rate neglect and conservatism
within each individual. We suggest that this method shows great potential for
studying human probabilistic reasoning. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-12T18:51:00Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-d8c21e4ca5ba4c76933170e513153307 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1930-2975 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-12T18:51:00Z |
publishDate | 2022-09-01 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | Article |
series | Judgment and Decision Making |
spelling | doaj.art-d8c21e4ca5ba4c76933170e5131533072023-08-02T07:14:45ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752022-09-01175962987Base rate neglect and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full distributionsPiers Douglas Lionel HoweAndrew PerforsBradley WalkerYoshihisa KashimaNicolas FayBayesian statistics offers a normative description for how a person should combine their original beliefs (i.e., their priors) in light of new evidence (i.e., the likelihood). Previous research suggests that people tend to under-weight both their prior (base rate neglect) and the likelihood (conservatism), although this varies by individual and situation. Yet this work generally elicits people's knowledge as single point estimates (e.g., x has a 5% probability of occurring) rather than as a full distribution. Here we demonstrate the utility of eliciting and fitting full distributions when studying these questions. Across three experiments, we found substantial variation in the extent to which people showed base rate neglect and conservatism, which our method allowed us to measure for the first time simultaneously at the level of the individual. While most people tended to disregard the base rate, they did so less when the prior was made explicit. Although many individuals were conservative, there was no apparent systematic relationship between base rate neglect and conservatism within each individual. We suggest that this method shows great potential for studying human probabilistic reasoning.http://journal.sjdm.org/21/210928/jdm210928.pdfbayesian probability belief integration prior posterior likelihood optimality base rate neglect conservatismnakeywords |
spellingShingle | Piers Douglas Lionel Howe Andrew Perfors Bradley Walker Yoshihisa Kashima Nicolas Fay Base rate neglect and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full distributions Judgment and Decision Making bayesian probability belief integration prior posterior likelihood optimality base rate neglect conservatismnakeywords |
title | Base rate neglect
and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full
distributions |
title_full | Base rate neglect
and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full
distributions |
title_fullStr | Base rate neglect
and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full
distributions |
title_full_unstemmed | Base rate neglect
and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full
distributions |
title_short | Base rate neglect
and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full
distributions |
title_sort | base rate neglect and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning insights from eliciting full distributions |
topic | bayesian probability belief integration prior posterior likelihood optimality base rate neglect conservatismnakeywords |
url | http://journal.sjdm.org/21/210928/jdm210928.pdf |
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