PARADOXES OF FEDERALISM?: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FISICAL DECENTRALIZATION IN ARGENTINA AND SPAIN

This paper suggests a putative paradox of federalism, namely that formalfederal polities, which are normally based on strong bicameralism, can at timesbe less effective than more loose, yet decentralizing unitary systems in deepeningfiscal decentralization. For that purpose, case studies of Argentin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jorge P. Gordin
Format: Article
Language:Catalan
Published: Institut d'Estudis de l'Autogovern 2010-10-01
Series:Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www10.gencat.cat/drep/binaris/_reaf11_Gordin_tcm112-132305.pdf