Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not
In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of...
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| Formaat: | Artikel |
| Taal: | English |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Academy of Cognitive and Natural Sciences
2019-11-01
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| Reeks: | Актуальні проблеми духовності |
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| Online toegang: | https://journal.kdpu.edu.ua/apd/article/view/2598 |