Holding CEOs Accountable: Improving Compensation Structure

Holding CEOs Accountable: Improving Compensation Structure

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This paper presents three different hypotheses that attempt to explain the CEO compensation structure and the optimal contract, managerial power, and tournament system hypotheses. Using knowledge gained from these three hypotheses, a brief analysis of the reasons the government needs to be involved...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hung W Chu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: UUM Press 2010-12-01
Series:International Journal of Management Studies
Subjects:
Executive compensation
optimal contracting
managerial power
tournament system
Online Access:https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/ijms/article/view/10002

Internet

https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/ijms/article/view/10002

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