Simple Incentives and Group Dependence for Successful Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Evidence from an Experimental Game in Rural Lao PDR

Simple Incentives and Group Dependence for Successful Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Evidence from an Experimental Game in Rural Lao PDR

Abstract In this article, we use a new game‐based tool to evaluate the immediate and longer term behavioral change potential of three different payments for ecosystem services (PES) delivery mechanisms: direct payments for individual performance, direct payments for group performance, and insurance....

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Carl Salk, Maria‐Claudia Lopez, Grace Wong
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2017-07-01
Series:Conservation Letters
Subjects:
Agriculture
experimental games
forest
incentives
Laos
payments for environmental services
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12277

Internet

https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12277

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