Evolutionary Game Analysis on Safety Supervision for Coal Mine Considering Speculative Behavior

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Safety Supervision for Coal Mine Considering Speculative Behavior

This paper considers the speculative behavior of coal mining enterprises and regulatory authorities, and uses evolutionary game theory to study safety supervision in production process of coal mine. It describes the game strategies of coal mining enterprises and regulatory authorities as safety prod...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jun Tu, Qiufeng Shi, Meiqi Li, Jingming Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2024-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Evolutionary game
coal mining production
investment level
safety supervision
speculative behavior
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10423009/

Internet

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10423009/

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