Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality

Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality of the players, the better the set of obtainable outcomes. In this paper, we...

全面介紹

書目詳細資料
Main Authors: Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio, Pass, Rafael
其他作者: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
格式: Article
語言:en_US
出版: The Econometric Society 2016
在線閱讀:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100963
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064