Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality
Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality of the players, the better the set of obtainable outcomes. In this paper, we...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
The Econometric Society
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100963 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |
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Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-k rationality
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