Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly compa...
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| Formato: | Artigo |
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American Economic Association
2018
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| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113678 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6992-8956 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0772-9457 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1258-3472 |