Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly compa...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
American Economic Association
2018
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113678 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6992-8956 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0772-9457 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1258-3472 |
| _version_ | 1826202187282251776 |
|---|---|
| author | AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila Angrist, Joshua Narita, Yusuke Pathak, Parag Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila Angrist, Joshua Narita, Yusuke Pathak, Parag Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres |
| author_sort | AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:03:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/113678 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:03:34Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1136782024-06-27T19:10:37Z Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila Angrist, Joshua Narita, Yusuke Pathak, Parag Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Angrist, Joshua Narita, Yusuke Pathak, Parag Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools. 2018-02-15T13:58:49Z 2018-02-15T13:58:49Z 2017-05 2018-02-14T18:38:59Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113678 AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila et al. “Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago’s Exam Schools.” American Economic Review 107, 5 (May 2017): 240–245 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6992-8956 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0772-9457 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1258-3472 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/AER.P20171111 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila Angrist, Joshua Narita, Yusuke Pathak, Parag Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools |
| title | Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools |
| title_full | Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools |
| title_fullStr | Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools |
| title_full_unstemmed | Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools |
| title_short | Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools |
| title_sort | regression discontinuity in serial dictatorship achievement effects at chicago s exam schools |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113678 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6992-8956 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0772-9457 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1258-3472 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT abdulkadirogluatila regressiondiscontinuityinserialdictatorshipachievementeffectsatchicagosexamschools AT angristjoshua regressiondiscontinuityinserialdictatorshipachievementeffectsatchicagosexamschools AT naritayusuke regressiondiscontinuityinserialdictatorshipachievementeffectsatchicagosexamschools AT pathakparag regressiondiscontinuityinserialdictatorshipachievementeffectsatchicagosexamschools AT zaratevasquezromanandres regressiondiscontinuityinserialdictatorshipachievementeffectsatchicagosexamschools |