The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable school...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
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2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113698 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5002-0374 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
| _version_ | 1826190461194207232 |
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| author | Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila Agarwal, Nikhil Pathak, Parag |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila Agarwal, Nikhil Pathak, Parag |
| author_sort | Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:40:36Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/113698 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:40:36Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1136982022-09-23T13:48:43Z The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila Agarwal, Nikhil Pathak, Parag Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Agarwal, Nikhil Pathak, Parag Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant SES-1427231) Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Grant BR2012-068) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant SES-1056325 ) 2018-02-15T20:03:55Z 2018-02-15T20:03:55Z 2017-12 2018-02-13T17:19:00Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113698 Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila et al. “The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match.” American Economic Review 107, 12 (December 2017): 3635–3689 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5002-0374 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila Agarwal, Nikhil Pathak, Parag The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match |
| title | The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match |
| title_full | The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match |
| title_fullStr | The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match |
| title_short | The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match |
| title_sort | welfare effects of coordinated assignment evidence from the new york city high school match |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113698 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5002-0374 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
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