The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable school...
Main Authors: | Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Agarwal, Nikhil, Pathak, Parag |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
2018
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113698 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5002-0374 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
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