Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information
We consider learning and signalling in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly where firms have private information about their production costs and only observe the market price, which is subject to unobservable demand shocks. An equilibrium is Markov if play depends on the history only through the firms’ beli...
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Oxford University Press
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/114280 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9150-2334 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0641-4960 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0400-5733 |