Why Take Both Boxes?
The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxin...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115358 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1698-8346 |
| _version_ | 1811096910829715456 |
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| author | Spencer, Jack Wells, Ian Thomas |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Spencer, Jack Wells, Ian Thomas |
| author_sort | Spencer, Jack |
| collection | MIT |
| description | The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:51:18Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/115358 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:51:18Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1153582022-10-03T08:45:14Z Why Take Both Boxes? Spencer, Jack Wells, Ian Thomas Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Wells, Ian Thomas The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization. 2018-05-14T14:31:39Z 2018-05-14T14:31:39Z 2017-10 2018-05-14T13:35:08Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 00318205 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115358 Spencer, Jack and Ian Wells. “Why Take Both Boxes?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (October 2017) © 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1698-8346 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/PHPR.12466 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Wiley-Blackwell MIT Web Domain |
| spellingShingle | Spencer, Jack Wells, Ian Thomas Why Take Both Boxes? |
| title | Why Take Both Boxes? |
| title_full | Why Take Both Boxes? |
| title_fullStr | Why Take Both Boxes? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why Take Both Boxes? |
| title_short | Why Take Both Boxes? |
| title_sort | why take both boxes |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/115358 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1698-8346 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT spencerjack whytakebothboxes AT wellsianthomas whytakebothboxes |