Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement versus Specialized Enforcement

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>We introduce the possibility of coercive punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. We assume that, just as regular agents need to be given incentives to cooperate with each other, specialized...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: Acemoglu, Daron, Wolitzky, Alexander
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Μορφή: Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Oxford University Press (OUP) 2021
Διαθέσιμο Online:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136536